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The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security 
Shahar Hameiri      Lee Jones 
Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University       Queen Mary, University of London 
 
The international security literature has recently observed the growing “securitization” 
of issues outside the traditional concern with interstate military conflict. However, this 
literature offers only limited explanations of this tendency, and largely neglects to 
explain how the new security issues are actually governed in practice, despite apparent 
“securitization” leading to divergent outcomes across time and space. We argue that the 
rise of non-traditional security should be conceptualized not simply as the discursive 
identification of new threats but as part of a deep-seated historical transformation in the 
scale of state institutions and activities, notably the rise of regulatory forms of statehood 
and the relativization of scales of governance. The most salient feature of the politics of 
non-traditional security lies in key actors’ efforts to rescale the governance of particular 
issues from the national level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas and, in so 
doing, transform state apparatuses. The governance that actually emerges in practice can 
be understood as an outcome of conflicts between these actors and those resisting their 
rescaling attempts. The argument is illustrated with a case study of environmental 
security governance in Southeast Asia. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, “non-traditional” security (NTS) challenges increasingly occupied 
scholars, security practitioners and ordinary people around the world, a trend reinforced by 
9/11 and other high-profile terrorist attacks (see White House 2002; UN 2004). Traditionally, 
security threats were viewed through the prism of state survival and conceived mainly in 
terms of inter-state military conflict. More recently, security has come to also be associated 
with a wide-range of non-traditional, mostly trans-national issues, including terrorism, 
environmental degradation and climate change, infectious disease, transnational crime, and 
illegal migration.
1
 These are thought to traverse national borders or operate beyond the scope 
of conventional state action; they are not necessarily seen to directly threaten the state’s very 
existence, but challenge its real or perceived capacity to protect affected populations. These 
developments raise two interrelated questions. First, what explains the current prominence of 
NTS issues on the security agendas of governments and international organizations? Second, 
what factors shape the manner in which NTS issues are understood and managed in practice? 
The first question is significant because many of the issues to which NTS refers are not new 
but have recently come to be seen and managed differently. The second is significant 
because, while traditional security concerns reify the organization of world politics along 
                                                          
1
 Contra Buzan and Hansen (2009), “non-traditional” refers here to security issues outside a traditional concern 
for military conflict and state survival, rather than to the analytical approach used to examine these issues.  
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state borders, NTS issues tend to traverse these. Therefore, important questions, such as who 
manages these problems and how, are not necessarily self-understood and settled. 
 The existing literature on NTS has pursued alternative questions, and consequently 
offers only limited answers to these questions. The field has predominantly been concerned 
with exploring or challenging “securitization,” the discursive, political process whereby new 
threats to security are identified (Buzan et al. 1998). This approach, pioneered by the 
“Copenhagen school” of security studies, does not see NTS politics as a fundamentally new 
phenomenon that demands explanation, but rather as the lengthening of a “laundry list” of 
security concerns, and thus largely neglects our first question. Focusing on discursive 
securitization also leads Copenhagen scholars to neglect to explain how NTS issues are 
subsequently governed, despite the fact that very different governance arrangements have 
arisen to tackle ostensibly similarly securitized problems. By focusing on the expansion of 
the “field” of security professionals, the “Paris school” offers a more promising explanation 
of the widening of the security agenda and security governance (CASE Collective 2006). 
However, its neglect of broader socio-political and economic dynamics leads it to over-
privilege the agency of this narrow set of agencies.  
 We argue that the rise of NTS reflects a more fundamental transformation: in short, 
security is becoming “non-traditional” because states are also becoming “non-traditional.” 
Growing concern with NTS both reflects and facilitates the contested and uneven 
disaggregation of national statehood and the rise of devolved and regulatory forms of 
statehood, through which the national scale of governance has been relativized and now 
competes with other scales. The salient feature of the politics of NTS is the attempt to rescale 
security’s spaces, discourses and management from the national level to a range of new 
spatial, political and/or institutional arenas, in alignment with the interests, strategies and 
ideologies of key actors, thereby further transforming state apparatuses. The governance 
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arrangements that emerge in practice reflect the conflicts between these actors and those 
resisting their rescaling efforts. This is emphatically not to say that the emergence of NTS 
issues has led to states becoming less important sites of security policy and regulation, or that 
states are withering away. Rather, it is to highlight that identifying particular issues as “non-
traditional” and hence not easily contained within national borders has permitted their 
governance to be shifted beyond the national political arena and, in some cases, outside the 
established institutions of national government into the hands of actors – often experts in 
particular areas – who are not politically and popularly accountable. The identification of 
these issues as matters of security – existentially dangerous, or potentially so – serves to 
rationalize and legitimize this rescaling process. The result is an expansion of the breadth and 
depth of the regulatory state and of administrative forms of power. 
This article proceeds as follows. The first section briefly examines the strengths and 
limitations of current critical approaches for examining security’s expansion, arguing that 
they largely neglect or offer only limited answers to our questions. The following section 
advances our own analysis of the rise of NTS and its governance. It locates these phenomena 
as part of historically-specific processes of state transformation associated with changes in 
the global political economy, notably the dismantling of the Keynesian-welfarist nation-state 
and the emergence of competing scales of governance and associated spatial imaginaries. 
Struggles over the meaning of security and its governance are conceptualized as part of 
broader conflicts over the spatial organization of political rule, with governance outcomes 
contingent upon the power and strategies of competing coalitions of actors, institutions and 
ideologies. The final section illustrates the argument through a case study of environmental 
security governance in Southeast Asia, where attempts to establish the complex, multi-level 
governance of forest fires have been constrained by powerful societal interests. 
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Non-Traditional Security: Current Approaches 
The widely observed and dramatic widening and deepening of the international security 
agenda has prompted much scholarly debate and theory-building since the 1980s. This 
section briefly surveys the main approaches and how they explain the rise of NTS and its 
governance, focusing in particular on the Copenhagen School and related approaches. While 
they may successfully describe the rhetorical broadening of the security agenda to encompass 
NTS issues, these approaches tend to neglect the wider historical processes of political, social 
and economic transformation of which this expansion forms part, and which help explain and 
contextualize it. Relatedly, by adopting an overly static view of states and a relatively narrow 
view of politics, they also neglect to explore how new security issues are governed in practice 
in different contexts. 
 One of the main fault-lines in contemporary security studies is between those who see 
“(in)security” as an objective condition and those who emphasize its social construction. 
Early debates largely revolved around whether the notion of “security” should be broadened 
at all (Ullman 1983; Jahn et al. 1987; Walt 1991; Booth 1991). Traditional realists tended to 
argue that widening the security agenda risked making both scholarship and state policy 
incoherent. Others saw the broadening of security as potentially emancipatory, allowing its 
focus to shift from the state to “human security” (Booth 1991). Ultimately the “wideners-
deepeners” prevailed and the study of NTS is now firmly ensconced within security studies 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009:44). Those who view security as an objective phenomenon now use 
a broadly “realist” ontology to explain the rise of NTS. For them, it simply reflects post-Cold 
War changes in the threat environment, particularly globalization’s impact in creating new 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities for states and people, to which governments must now 
respond (Brown 2003; Dupont 2001).  
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 The main drawback of this scholarship is that many issues depicted as “new” security 
concerns are not new at all; rather, they have recently come to be viewed – and managed – 
differently. For example, the 1918-19 Spanish Flu, which killed around 50 million people 
worldwide, was at the time viewed as part of the general misery of the Great War and its 
aftermath. The first book dedicated to it was only published in the mid-1970s. Today, 
however, the Spanish Flu is constantly invoked by public health practitioners and 
policymakers to justify intrusive “pandemic preparedness” measures to prevent a similar 
catastrophe (Wraith and Stephenson 2009). 
More promising, then, is scholarship that recognizes the socially constructed nature of 
security. From this perspective, security threats are not objectively given but instead reflect 
the development of intersubjectively shared understandings, in which some thing is 
discursively framed as posing an existential threat to some valued referent object. This 
“securitization” process has been a guiding framework for a large body of constructivist and 
poststructuralist scholarship which analyzes and problematizes the concept of security (CASE 
Collective 2006). Through their focus on the creative agency of policy elites, they offer a 
more compelling explanation of how new issues are added to the security agenda. However, 
despite their sophisticated and significant contribution to security studies, including to our 
argument, these approaches do not fully address our questions. Because the scope of this 
article precludes thorough examination of all of these approaches, we organize our discussion 
around arguably the most influential one – the Copenhagen School’s (CS) securitization 
theory (Buzan et al. 1998). Much recent literature on security’s expansion has developed in 
relation to this, whether offering refinement or criticism. As we evaluate the CS, we draw on 
relevant insights from other critical approaches, but also explain why these, too, inadequately 
address the questions we investigate. 
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The Copenhagen School and Its Critics 
The CS’s influential intervention has played a crucial role in rejuvenating security studies. 
Nevertheless, the agenda it set and the analytical tools it deploys tell us only a limited amount 
about the securitization of NTS. Copenhagen scholars have identified and described how 
problems become security issues, focusing on changes in the discourse of security. However, 
given this limited problematique, they do not attempt to account for why this process is 
happening or how security issues are governed. This circumscribes what their approach tells 
us about the rise of NTS and its implications.  
The CS’s major conceptual contribution is the notion of “securitization.” It is through 
inventing this concept that debate over whether the international security agenda should be 
broadened was “‘solved’... by fixing form: whenever something took the form of the 
particular speech act of securitization, with a securitizing actor claiming an existential threat 
to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that 
otherwise would not have been acceptable, this was a case of securitization” (Wæver 
2011:469; emphasis in original). In line with the broader constructivist turn in International 
Relations, Copenhagen scholars rightly argued that the broadening security agenda did not 
simply reflect objective shifts in the threat environment but was instead being socially 
constructed.  
Their choice of how to theorize this construction has profoundly shaped their 
subsequent problematique and research agenda. For them, the securitization process is 
fundamentally discursive: drawing on language theorist J.L. Austin, Wæver (1995) defines 
securitization as a “speech act.” Whether the speech act succeeds in securitizing a given issue 
depends on certain facilitating conditions, including the speaker’s requirement to follow “the 
grammar of security,” the nature of the relationship between speaker and audience, and the 
features of the alleged threat (Buzan et al. 1998:33). When successful, the speaker transforms 
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the issue into a matter of “security,” placing it at the top of the political agenda and 
legitimizing the use of extraordinary resources and exceptional measures to tackle the 
“threat,” including the suspension of the normal rules and procedures of political life. This 
emphasis on the speech act has focused subsequent analytical attention on the “productive 
moment... of securitization” (Wæver 2011:468) – describing the discursive process through 
which new issues become intersubjectively understood as matters of security. Although this 
focus has generated many interesting studies, it also limits the CS’s scope of inquiry in 
important ways that constrain what it can tell us about the rise of NTS and its implications for 
security practice and governance.  
Firstly, as many critics argue, the “speech act” theory of securitization wrongly 
emphasizes utterances at the expense of other important dimensions of securitization, such as 
images, unstated sentiments, physical action and security practices (Williams 2003; Balzacq 
2005; Huysmans 2006; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008). A related point, though, often missed 
by these critics, is that emphasizing discourse without reference to material context also 
presents “securitization” as a timeless, generic process, as applicable to the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War as to HIV/AIDS today.
2
 The only difference is that NTS issues appear to 
have become more important than before. Explaining why is largely outside of the CS’s 
research agenda, and there is little within its analytical toolbox that could be used to explore 
this question.  
Secondly, as poststructuralist and Paris School critics argue, the CS’s definition of 
securitization excludes a great deal of contemporary security practice. The CS contends that 
to retain conceptual coherence, the notion of “security” can only apply to those issues 
identified or constructed as constituting existential danger to something else. But the majority 
                                                          
2
 Some poststructuralist definitions of discourse may encompass the material or institutional contexts in which 
frameworks of meaning are embedded. In highlighting the limitations of “discursive” approaches we refer more 
narrowly to the constructivist use of “discourse” to denote speech-acts. 
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of “new” NTS issues are not actually governed as if they are urgent existential threats but 
rather as potentially existential dangers or risks. Risk and risk management have a long 
history, in financial and insurance services, for example. However, as Beck (1999) argues, 
recently, policymakers and ordinary people, particularly in the West, have become 
preoccupied with new kinds of risk. Such risks – for example, climate change, global 
pandemics, or terrorists using weapons of mass destruction – have a low probability of 
occurring, but their consequences are seen as potentially catastrophic, defying conventional 
forms of management, insurance and compensation. Although these risks refer to potentially 
existential dangers, their management rarely resembles the politics of mass mobilization and 
“extraordinary measures” typically associated with more traditional securitizations. Instead, 
we see the development of enhanced systems of detection and management, underpinned by 
various forms of technical, managerial and scientific expertise, which is often essential to 
know the problem even exists, as in the case of climate science.  
Consequently, securitizing NTS issues does not necessarily involve legitimizing or 
taking exceptional measures. Instead, as some critics note, it often involves extending routine 
practices from one area of government/governance to another, or the bureaucratization of 
governance, neither of which requires the assent of an identifiable audience, as the “speech 
act” theory supposes (Balzacq 2008) or a break with politics as usual (Stritzel 2007:367). In 
some cases, the policy tools themselves transform the threat’s image and hence security 
policy: governance thus precedes or even supersedes public discourse (Balzacq 2008:77; 
Huysmans 2006:10-11), as, for example, in the case of the extension of existing forms of 
surveillance and policing to civil aviation after 9-11 (Aradau and van Munster 2007).  
Wæver (2011:474) concedes that the rise of such practices “represent[s] a serious 
challenge to securitization theory.” His preference, however, is to retain a narrow definition 
of securitization, even if the “utility and power” of “the theoretical model contracts,” leaving 
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others to theorize risk management as a distinct phenomenon. Yet, the line between 
securitization and risk management Wæver is defending is hard to draw, even from within the 
CS’s model. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates that even when exceptional 
powers of war-making are sought, they are often justified with reference to managing or 
eliminating risks, such as future terrorist attacks orchestrated from within Afghanistan’s 
borders. Indeed, military intervention was only the first step in a longer-term process of 
“state-building,” involving a wide range of governance actors.  
This neglect of security practice relates to our third critique, the CS’s inattention to 
explaining security governance. By “governance” we refer to a wide range of activities, 
performed by a diverse range of public and private actors, which include defining the nature 
and sources of security problems, devising plans and policies to ameliorate them, engaging in 
the actual management of these issues, and auditing the performance of security practitioners. 
These issues appear connected with, but are marginal to, the CS’s research agenda. They are 
implicitly interested in the question of “what difference does securitization make[?]” because 
“it is the effects that securitization has that make it attractive (or not) for various actors to 
pursue” (Wæver 2011:476; emphasis in original). However, Copenhagen scholars appear to 
believe that securitization co-constructs threats, referent objects and means simultaneously; 
that is, that security governance is discursively generated as part of the “speech act” (Buzan 
et al. 1998:26). Successful securitizations enable extraordinary measures. Beyond this, 
Copenhagen scholars have paid little attention to what governance arrangements – if any – 
actually emerge. 
In practice, however, governance changes do not automatically accompany discursive 
changes, nor do urgent or exceptional measures, particularly in the case of risk management. 
For example, in Southeast Asia, the World Health Organization (WHO) has discursively 
securitized infectious diseases, and regional governments now regularly refer to them as 
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threats to their security; yet, in practice, little concerted action has ensued (Caballero-
Anthony 2008). By focusing on the “productive moment” of securitization, the CS has both 
neglected to explore such gaps between security discourse and actual governance and to 
develop any theoretical apparatus capable of explaining the particular forms that security 
governance takes (Jones 2011). It may quite reasonably be argued that the issue of 
governance is deliberately excluded from the parsimonious “securitization” model. But this is 
a significant limitation for scholars of security and of NTS in particular, because very 
different modes of governance have emerged to deal with apparently similar issues in 
different areas and regions, at different times, and with varying effects.  
One group of scholars that has addressed security governance more directly is the 
“Paris School” (CASE Collective 2006). They emphasize the role of professional networks of 
security agencies that attempt to shape the “truth” about threats and risks through their 
positions as experts and their actual capacity to create and govern borders, and to manage and 
define threats (CASE Collective 2006:457). Bigo (2001), for example, demonstrates how 
internal and external security are increasingly conflated through the extension of internal 
policing practices beyond state borders and the domestic deployment of the military. This 
focus on the practices of security professionals means that the Paris School has, unlike the 
CS, explored the relationship between the expansion of the security agenda and the way in 
which security is governed. Security’s expansion is explained by the increasing integration of 
the various agencies concerned with disparate areas of governance into a single “field,” 
resulting in the differences between threats disappearing and the placing of all security issues 
onto a continuum of traditional and NTS issues (CASE Collective 2006:459). This 
integration also helps explain the form that governance takes. Paris scholars argue that the 
security field is not fixed and the location of agents and their influence is shaped by the 
configuration of context, the nature of the issue at stake and the power struggles between 
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professionals (Balzacq 2005). Security is thus theorized in terms of the real practices of state 
apparatuses, not simply political elites’ speech acts. It is less important to know what security 
“means” than how it is used to shape and govern society. Hence, the issues of what security is 
and how it is practiced are intrinsically related (Huysmans 2006). 
These insights are useful. Yet, by focusing almost exclusively on security 
professionals’ networks, the Paris School potentially privileges the agency of an even smaller 
number of people than the CS. What is missing is sustained examination of the relationship 
between this “field” and its socio-political and economic context. Broader political, social 
and economic transformations, particularly contested changes in statehood, as well as the 
interests supporting or resisting the exercise of state power in various instances, powerfully 
shape the security field and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by professionals.  
What we take from the CS and its constructivist and poststructuralist critics, therefore, 
is the notion that security is socially constructed; that it refers to, at least potentially, 
existential dangers; that securitization inherently empowers some actors at the expense of 
others; that discourse plays some role in defining security; and that networks of experts and 
officials are an important aspect of security governance. However, to fully understand the rise 
of NTS and its implications, our conception of securitization processes needs expanding to 
encompass broader historical and material processes of state transformation and we need to 
develop conceptual tools capable of analyzing security governance that go beyond security 
practitioners and their networks. 
 
State Transformation and the Rescaling of Security 
The rise of NTS cannot be understood simply as a shift in discourse or security professionals’ 
practices: it is part of a much broader, material transformation of states and the global 
political economy. The most salient feature of the politics of NTS is the struggle to alter the 
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scale at which particular issues are governed, from the national level to a variety of new 
spatial and territorial arenas, and to transform state apparatuses accordingly. This is because, 
typically, NTS issues are discursively presented as transnational in nature, meaning that 
traditional, nationally-based governance is now unfit for purpose and must be superseded by 
new instruments that match the scope of the threat. Such claims reflect (and further enable) 
the disaggregation of nation-statehood and the rise of regulatory and multilevel governance. 
This is a deep-seated, historical transformation of state institutions and activities, associated 
with changes in the global political economy since the 1970s. These changes have relativized 
the national scale: it no longer seems the most obvious or “natural” level at which issues 
should be governed. This relativization fuels and makes credible the claims associated with 
the NTS agenda.  
To understand the practical politics of NTS, we must recognize that the claims made 
about NTS issues and the accompanying efforts to rescale governance – however 
“commonsensical” they may appear – are not uncontested. Different scales involve different 
configurations of actors, resources and political opportunities, always privileging some 
actors, interests and ideologies over others. Consequently, while some socio-political 
coalitions promote rescaling, others will resist it. The inter-scalar conflict between these 
coalitions – whose composition and relative power are also shaped by material processes – is 
what determines how NTS issues are identified and governed in practice.  
 
The Centrality of Scale in the Politics of NTS 
There is one crucial way in which so-called NTS issues differ conceptually from traditional 
security issues, which is missed by the approaches considered above: they are typically 
viewed as transnational, or at least potentially so. Their perceived transnational character 
underpins the oft-repeated claim that their effective management requires moving beyond the 
Final version appears in International Studies Quarterly, 57, no. 3 (2013): 462-473 
14 
political and practical constraints of national governance. For example, Dupont (2001:8) 
argues that  
deforestation results not only in the loss of a valuable resource for a local community or 
particular state. It can also trigger catastrophic flooding across national borders and contribute 
to widespread pollution and climate change that, in turn, may cause food shortages, population 
displacement, economic damage and death.   
Such framing of NTS issues intrinsically raises questions of scale: they posit that threats have 
expanded in scope, beyond the national level, and urge commensurate shifts in governance to 
manage the problem. This rescaling of NTS issues – the scope of the threat, its referent 
object, and its governance – is the most crucial aspect of their securitization. Indeed, their 
relocation beyond the national scale, though not necessarily altogether out of the hands of 
state actors, partly constitutes their securitization, while the discourse of threat helps 
rationalize the rescaling of governance to other levels. This does not simply mean shifting the 
issue into regional inter-governmental forums, for example, but can involve the rescaling of 
particular state apparatuses themselves by inserting them into or making them answerable to 
international or transnational governance systems. This process is always contested, 
involving subjective, political strategies, rather than simply being a rational response to an 
objective threat environment, because different scales privilege different interests and 
ideologies. The politics of NTS thus involves different coalitions of actors struggling to 
define the nature of the problem and the appropriate scale at which it should be governed. 
The process may involve discursive strategies but is not limited simply to (indeed, may not 
even involve) demanding exceptional measures and, to yield real-world effects, also involves 
going beyond discourse to materially produce new governance arrangements or rescale 
existing ones. Below, we begin to elaborate the centrality of scale and rescaling to NTS by 
considering the relationship between space (or scale) and political rule in general, and to 
processes of state-transformation specifically. 
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One of critical political geography’s chief insights has been that space and society are 
mutually constituted. Power relationships run through the construction of space and, in turn, 
the spatial organization of political and economic governance helps (re)produce particular 
power relations in society (Harvey 2006). For example, at the most basic level, the extent of 
the territory over which a state exercises sovereignty has enormous repercussions for the 
number of people sharing particular identities, the type and amount of natural resources 
available, the size of internal markets, the number of political actors with citizenship rights 
and the extent of their networks, and so on. Consequently, “the extensiveness of a territory 
can play a crucial role in determining the balance of power among competing territorial 
groups and institutions” (Miller 2009:54). This point is often overlooked by IR scholars – 
including many wideners-deepeners in security studies – who typically take the territorial 
configuration of “nation-states” for granted, ignoring the contested processes through which 
these configurations have historically been created and transformed (Agnew 1994).  
One result of this confinement within the “territorial trap” is a neglect of territorial 
politics as a crucial aspect of social and political struggle. Societal and state actors seek to 
manipulate space and its political consequences by adopting “territorial strategies… 
mobilizing state institutions to shape and reshape inherited territorial structurations of 
political-economic life, including those of state institutions themselves” (Brenner and Elden 
2009:368). These strategies are constrained by existing institutional arrangements, including 
established international borders, national sovereignty, and international law, which in 
themselves are manifestations of earlier contested processes of territorialization (see Tilly 
1992). Yet, to the extent that they transform the spatial configuration of political and 
economic rule, they can have profound consequences. 
This becomes particularly clear when considering the issue of scale. Whether a 
political issue is defined as urban/local, provincial, national, regional, global, and so on, is not 
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neutral but, because each scale involves different configurations of actors, resources and 
political opportunity structures, always privileges certain societal interests and values over 
others. Together with the nature of the coalitions which organize around various scalar 
framings, it is one of the most important factors that determine the outcome of social and 
political conflicts over a given issue. Precisely because the scale of governance matters so 
much, actors will typically attempt to rescale issues as a way of (re)producing particular 
power relations favorable to themselves and their allies, while other actors and coalitions will 
resist such efforts if they are deleterious to them (see Gibson 2005). The strategy of “scale 
jumping” – shifting political contestation to a different scale to bring in new actors and 
resources –  has been used by movements as disparate as the Zapatistas, labor unions, 
indigenous peoples’ organizations, feminists, environmentalists and living wage campaigners 
(Leitner and Sheppard 2009:233). Although the study of territorial politics typically focuses 
on domestic political struggles, there is no reason why the governance of particular issues 
cannot be rescaled to levels beyond state borders: there is no “initial moment that creates a 
framework or container within which future struggles are played out” (Brenner and Elden 
2009:367). The presentation of NTS issues as “transnational” is itself to insist on governing 
them outside of national frameworks, although not necessarily by non-state actors.  
For example, emphasizing the potential spill-over of NTS problems to Australia from 
nearby “failing” states has been the mechanism through which the Australian government has 
rescaled – “regionalized” – Australian domestic security. Australian national security no 
longer simply means protecting Australia’s shores from aggressors, but also ensuring the 
effectiveness of the governing institutions and processes of neighboring countries. One 
manifestation of this shift has been the transnationalization of agencies like the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP), previously a domestic law-enforcement agency. The AFP is now 
tasked with new roles such as building regional counterparts’ capacity or even active offshore 
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policing (Hameiri 2009). This example reveals that the rescaling processes associated with 
NTS involve not merely rescaling particular issues but also the apparatuses tasked to deal 
with them, in the intervened and intervening countries. From this perspective, the politics of 
NTS differs radically from that of traditional security. Securitizing NTS issues does not 
simply add to a list of security concerns for states whose fundamental nature remains 
unchanged. Rather, by virtue of their transnational nature, the securitization of NTS issues is 
part of a process of state transformation.  
Understanding how and why such transformation occurs is easier if we understand the 
state not merely as a set of institutions, agencies and actors, but primarily as a social relation 
and expression of power (Poulantzas 1978; Jessop 1990). State power is a set of complex and 
dynamic social and political relationships that shape the use of the state apparatus. Conflict 
among historically specific coalitions of social and political forces rooted primarily in the 
political economy – classes, class fractions, distributional coalitions and other societal groups 
– is consequently crucial for understanding why particular state forms and institutions 
emerge, and explaining the way they function. To analyze how and why issues are identified 
and governed as NTS issues thus involves identifying the conflicts between the different 
contending coalitions that organize around them, both within and beyond the state, and drive 
or resist processes of state transformation. The actual governance regimes which emerge in 
practice can be understood as a contingent outcome of these struggles. To understand why the 
governance of NTS is fought out transnationally today, however, it is important to situate 
these conflicts within a historically-specific process of state transformation associated with 
recent changes in the global political economy. 
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Why Now? NTS and the Emergence of the Regulatory State 
We reject the empiricist claim that the rise of NTS is simply a reflection of changes in the 
threat environment associated with globalization. Although some material circumstances 
have changed, many “new” threats are, as noted earlier, not new at all. What is new is the 
rescaling of governance associated with the (partial and uneven) dismantling of the 
Keynesian-welfare state of the postwar period in the West, and later with associated 
transformation processes occurring elsewhere. These changes have given rise to a 
relativization of scale, new spatial imaginaries and forms of disaggregated regulatory 
statehood that prompt and enable the rescaling of security governance. 
 In the decades immediately following World War II, the national scale of governance 
was extremely dominant. The Bretton Woods Keynesian-Fordist economic settlement 
affirmed the primacy of national money over international currency and established the 
individual and social wage as the basis of domestic demand. These priorities “were reflected 
in the primacy of national economies, national welfare states, and national societies managed 
by national states concerned to unify national territories” (Jessop 2009:99). At the 
international level, this was reflected by a strong determination to uphold state sovereignty 
and existing territorial borders, including those bequeathed to post-colonial states (Barkin and 
Cronin 1994), and by an understanding of international security as being fundamentally inter-
state in nature. However, the 1970s crisis of Western capitalism, marked by declining profit 
rates and stagflation, led to the de-emphasis and dismantling of key elements of postwar 
national governance. The demise of the gold standard in 1971 was followed by rapid 
economic liberalization, cemented by the elections of the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations. Neoliberal reforms designed to break the power of organized labor – which 
relied on national bargaining – involved opening up national economies to international 
competition. These reforms were championed by fractions of large-scale merchant and 
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finance capital, which pushed for the creation of new, global scales of capital accumulation 
(Harvey 2005).  
These developments have “relativized” the national scale of governance: it no longer 
has a “taken-for-granted” quality as the best level at which political, economic or security 
issues should be governed. However, no other scale – whether local, regional or global – “has 
acquired a similar dominance. Instead, different economic and political spaces and forces 
located at different scales are competing to become the primary or nodal point of 
accumulation and/or state power. The relativization of scale also offers important new 
opportunities for scale jumping and struggles over interscalar articulation” (Jessop 2009:99). 
It is in this context that many scholars have observed the emergence of new forms of 
networked and multilevel governance, particularly in Europe. These new arrangements do not 
simply denote the withering away of the state but rather the relativization of the national scale 
and the emergence of disaggregated and regulatory forms of sovereign statehood. Central 
states are increasingly limited to “meta-governance,” overseeing a diverse range of private 
and public regulatory actors operating at multiple scales (Sassen 2006; Jessop 2009; 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). This affords considerable latitude for subnational agencies 
to construct new, multi-scalar governance arrangements including institutions and actors 
beyond national borders. For example, Ali and Keil (2009) show how the disaggregation of 
public health governance to local/municipal authorities in Canada under neoliberal reform 
processes, coupled with the identification of epidemic diseases as a transnational 
phenomenon, led to the City of Toronto devising new governance measures with the WHO 
during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak, completely bypassing the 
central Canadian state. 
 These transformations are not simply natural or rational responses to changing 
circumstances but reflect the uneven and contested processes by which the nationally based 
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class compromises which underpinned Keynesian national-welfare states were attacked and 
undermined. As part of these processes, government’s function has been redefined from 
securing a political accommodation between competing domestic interests to facilitating 
market-led development, providing regulation, and managing risk. The diffusion of authority 
to a multitude of governance actors, often operating outside the official boundaries of 
government, has played a crucial part in limiting the range of issues contested through the 
institutions of representative democracy, and has given considerable power to unelected 
experts – public and private – to define and govern particular issues (Swyngedouw 2005). 
These actors are now often part of complex governance structures involving governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-state actors that simultaneously operate across several scales. The 
result has been to weaken the power of organizations, such as trade unions, whose power 
depends upon national political and legal institutions (see Lillie 2010).  
Though the shift to regulatory statehood has originated, and been more pronounced, in 
Western Europe, North America, and Australasia, similar processes have been taking place to 
varying degrees elsewhere, including in East Asia – typically seen as a region of “strong” 
states, jealously guarding their sovereignty. There, state transformation has generally not 
been driven by efforts to undermine organized labor, whose weakness is a Cold War legacy. 
Rather it is related to the transnationalization and regionalization of production networks and 
investment driven by firms from outside the region and by East Asian state and state-linked 
capitalist interests. It has also been promoted by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the 
associated crisis of the developmental state project, as well as by the need to accommodate 
demands for political responsiveness from new groups emerging through decades of 
sustained economic growth (Jayasuriya 2005; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007). In Africa and the 
Southwest Pacific, where most so-called “fragile” states are located, state transformation 
processes have partly been facilitated by externally-imposed structural adjustment programs, 
Final version appears in International Studies Quarterly, 57, no. 3 (2013): 462-473 
21 
and Western state-building interventions designed to manage the external risks perceived to 
arise from social and political instability there (Hameiri 2010).  
The politics of NTS is a specific manifestation of these processes of state 
transformation. The framing of NTS issues as transnational in nature and requiring 
governance systems which map onto these problems reflects the relativization of scale, with 
the national level no longer being seen as the most appropriate one at which to manage 
collective problems. The securitization of ostensibly transnational issues is further prompted 
and legitimized by the emergence of new “spatial imaginaries,” through which political 
thought and identities are recast. Partly as a result of the creation of global market forces, 
capitalist interests and state managers encourage citizens to perceive and adjust their social 
and economic life in the context of global economic competition, creating a strong sense of a 
planetary scale on which economic flows now operate. This is reinforced by journalistic 
presentation of the world as “flat” and by academic discourse around “globalization.” State 
managers experimenting with transnationalized forms of governance promote new regional 
imaginaries to cultivate popular legitimacy for their projects, such as a “European” identity or 
an “ASEAN community.” Environmentalist NGOs construct “bioregions” that cut across 
domestic jurisdictions, encouraging us to imagine ourselves as part of regional or global 
ecosystems. Urban political elites and finance capital promote imaginaries of “global cities,” 
more connected to far-flung urban centers than their own hinterlands. The profusion of such 
post-national spatial imaginaries, coupled with the contemporary emphasis on risk, creates a 
far broader subjective sense of interconnectedness across space and of greater vulnerability to 
far-away developments, while implicitly or explicitly depicting nationally-based governance 
as fundamentally inadequate for the challenges we face. This facilitates the identification of 
NTS issues as being intrinsically transnational in nature and thus requiring rescaled forms of 
governance. Yet, these imaginaries’ discourse suggests, there is an intrinsically normative 
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element to the promotion of, or resistance to, rescaling, since different scalar arrangements 
always enable or constrain different socio-political and economic projects. 
However, like the process of state transformation itself, the securitization (or not) of 
particular issues is ultimately determined by struggles between the coalitions that organize 
around the issues concerned. Sometimes, securitization processes relate directly to 
imperatives of capitalist accumulation and are therefore bound up in conflicts between 
different fractions of capital, as in the case study on environmental security governance 
below. At other times, as in the AFP example above, the rescaling of governance may be 
shaped by overarching political imperatives in a regulatory state context, such as the need to 
reproduce political legitimacy (Purcell and Nevins 2005), primarily by demonstrating a 
capacity to manage the various NTS challenges associated with globalization (see Mabee 
2009). Specific forms of scientific and technical expertise often play a key role in the 
discursive construction and governance of NTS issues like cyber-crime and infectious disease 
(Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Elbe 2010). Tackling such issues has become politically 
important in the context of the spatial imaginary of a “world risk society” (Beck 1999). With 
the demise of class struggle as the animating force of politics, political elites also increasingly 
seek to mobilize support through appealing to and seeking to manage the widespread fear and 
insecurity accompanying the more precarious and individuated nature of contemporary social 
and economic life (Furedi 2005).  
Having outlined the historical processes and socio-political struggles involved in the 
securitization and governance of NTS, we can now illustrate our argument through a case 
study.  
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The Rescaling of Security and Southeast Asia’s Haze Problem 
Southeast Asia provides a “hard case” for our approach. The national scale of governance 
was a crucial locus for powerful forces during the Cold War, which built robust states and 
insisted on “non-interference” in their “internal” affairs in order to maintain non-communist 
order. Subsequently, many scholars argue, the “naked pursuit of Westphalian sovereignty 
epitomize[s] the essence of Asian security” (Moon and Chun 2003:107). However, this case 
study of efforts to govern emissions from forest fires (“haze”) as a regional NTS issue 
problematizes such judgments. Some forces have clearly attempted to construct a post-
Westphalian form of multilevel governance, rescaling parts of the Indonesian state apparatus 
to serve regional agendas and empowering experts to overcome nationally- and locally-based 
resistance. Yet, powerful opponents operating at the local and national scales have  limited 
the degree of rescaling the practical operation of state and regional apparatuses. 
Consequently, despite the discursive securitization of haze, which mainstream approaches 
would expect to generate “emergency” responses, its governance remains considerably 
constrained. The case thus clearly demonstrates the centrality of the contestation of scale and 
state transformation to the politics of NTS. 
 Each year, illegal Indonesian forest and land fires produce a thick smog that blankets 
large parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore and Malaysia. The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has identified this “haze” as a major transnational security 
threat (ASEAN 2006). While the fires themselves threaten lives, homes and livelihoods, the 
haze is also framed as a threat: to citizens’ health; to the regional economy, by damaging 
tourism, trade and investment; and to wider international society by contributing to global 
warming (ASEAN 2007:4). This discursive securitization reflects the costs of the haze and 
growing societal concern about the threats posed by environmental degradation, especially 
climate change. In 1997, one of the worst years, fires killed around 500 people, haze affected 
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the health of up to 70m people, and the total socio-economic and environmental cost was 
estimated at $9.3bn (Qadri 2001:52, 54). The carbon released was estimated at 13 to 40 per 
cent of total global annual emissions from fossil fuels (Page et al. 2002). In 2011, Indonesia 
was ranked as the world’s third-largest carbon dioxide emitter, forest and land fires 
comprising up to 85 per cent of its emissions. Particularly since haze was linked to climate 
change, the threat posed by haze is often presented in terms of potential dangers requiring 
forms of prevention and risk management. Doctors warn, for example, “that a generation of 
young children… may suffer permanent damage to their health” (The Economist 2000), while 
environmentalists insist on “united” action “because the potential dangers of climate change 
are too great to ignore” (World Bank 2007), and forestry experts caution that “the threat of 
future catastrophic fires looms large” (Dennis et al. 2005:498). However, as with other cases 
mentioned above, the discursive identification of a threat has been accompanied not by the 
emergency or extraordinary measures that Copenhagen scholars might anticipate, but by 
efforts to rescale governance to the regional level. 
 These efforts have been led by a loose coalition including the Singaporean, Malaysian 
and Indonesian environment ministries, Southeast Asian and Western environmental NGOs, 
and supportive international institutions including the Asian Development Bank, the ASEAN 
Secretariat, the UN Environment Program and Western governments’ international 
development agencies. By 1999, 35 donor projects had been launched to strengthen expert 
knowledge and networks and to enhance the capacity of forestry institutions to monitor and 
manage fires in Indonesia. The country is also a major focus for donor projects under the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation initiative. Regionally, ASEAN 
concluded a Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution in 1995, a Regional Haze Action 
Plan in 1997, an Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002, and the ASEAN 
Peatland Management Strategy in 2007. These agreements have tasked “national focal 
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points” to disseminate forestry and peatland governance standards crafted by regional experts 
and develop and/or coordinate domestic agencies to prevent and suppress forest fires. The 
ASEAN agreements thus established an internationally based regulatory framework, which 
set the agenda for national and sub-national regulatory and enforcement agencies, aspiring 
toward a complex form of multilevel governance. 
 
 
FIG 1. ASEAN Peatland Management System (source: ASEAN 2007:22-24) 
This has permitted the rescaling of some elements of the Indonesian state. As the 
“focal point” of regional governance, the Environment Ministry has clearly been inserted into 
an international architecture. Although lacking line responsibility, meaning its influence on 
the ground is limited, it has played a key role in improving the national coordination of line 
ministries to tackle fire and haze and setting environmental management norms and targets 
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for sub-national agencies. The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) has also been partly 
internationalised, with staff from Britain’s Department for International Development 
working within the ministry on forestry governance projects. The MoF has apparently used 
international attention and capacity-building assistance as part of its struggle to reassert its 
authority vis-à-vis local actors following the decentralisation of the Indonesian state in 1998, 
when the power to issue forestry permits was delegated to the district level. The MoF 
reclaimed this in 2001, but has since faced an uphill struggle to reassert its authority against 
bupatis (district chiefs). Foreign pressure and aid has enabled the MoF to strengthen its 
domestic surveillance capacities and create fire-fighting units stationed in 30 fire-prone 
districts. Intensified pressure from Jakarta has ostensibly corralled sub-national institutions 
into a fire control system seemingly extending from the international-regional to the village 
level. 
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FIG 2. Indonesian Fire Control System (source: MoE 2011) 
In addition to these formal structures, decentralization enabled Singapore to work 
directly with the Jambi provincial government to develop a Master Plan for the mitigation of 
fires, while Malaysia has engaged directly with several districts in Riau province (NEA 2009; 
DoE 2009). This also reflects the partial rescaling of the Malaysian and Singaporean 
ministries involved. Singapore’s Ministry of Environment and Water Resources, for example, 
now projects itself at “global, regional and bilateral levels,” since “today, environmental 
challenges… are global in scope and impact” (MEWR 2011).  
At the regional level, the Singapore-based ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre 
performs a regional surveillance function, uses satellite data to provide daily updates on 
“hotspots” which are used by regional governments to pressurize national and/or subnational 
agencies within Indonesia to suppress fires. This surveillance system has been enhanced 
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along risk-management lines, in an attempt to prevent fires escalating out of control and to 
bypass Indonesian resistance to accepting external help during major haze episodes. Since 
2005, when hotspots exceed a particular threshold, an ASEAN Panel of Experts on Fire and 
Haze is automatically deployed to at-risk areas to provide “rapid independent assessment and 
recommendation for the mobilization of resources during impending critical periods” 
(ASEAN 2010). The Indonesian government is now internationally accountable for its 
performance. Its progress against a regionally approved 2006 Plan of Action is regularly 
monitored at Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee meetings using “key performance 
indicators” (MoF n.d.). 
The securitization and governance of haze therefore reflects many of the dynamics of 
the politics of NTS identified earlier, notably those associated with managing potential 
dangers and rescaling. Haze is increasingly seen as a risk to health, economic prosperity and 
human security, particularly as it is linked with climate change. The scope of an issue once 
treated as a domestic problem has been expanded into a regional and even global one, while 
its governance involves the rescaling and transformation of state apparatuses. This 
governance increasingly encompasses diverse technical, expert and non-governmental bodies 
operating at multiple levels, alongside state officials. However, understanding how these 
formal governance arrangements operate in practice requires that we consider the resistance 
of a countervailing coalition of actors with strong interests in restricting environmental 
governance to a local/national level.  
Key among these are agro-industrial businesses, politicians and officials who benefit 
from the fires, which are principally used to clear land cheaply to establish agricultural 
plantations. Indonesia’s natural resources have been a key patronage resource for ruling elites 
since independence, and under Suharto a vast network of state-linked crony capitalists 
plundered the forests at will. The 1997 fires were predominantly caused by their 
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conglomerates systematically burning degraded forests and peatland to establish palm oil 
plantations (Dauvergne 1998). These agri-business interests remain deeply entrenched within 
the state system at all levels due to extensive corruption and collusion with officials and 
political elites. Indeed, decentralization has radically multiplied the opportunities for such 
relationships, with bupatis exchanging plantation licenses – control over which remains 
decentralized – to obtain kickbacks and political support (Smith et al. 2003). Large-scale, 
nationally licensed companies are now subject to internationalized surveillance and more 
robust regulation which, coupled with the threat of losing access to Western export markets 
and NGO pressures through bodies like the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and 
the Forestry Stewardship Council, have ostensibly forced many of them to adopt zero-
burning policies. However, smaller firms which obtain local licenses corruptly are frequently 
protected by their patrons and free to burn land with impunity, beyond the reach of national 
or provincial agencies. Indonesia’s law-enforcement services have also long been involved in 
such illegal activities, assisting powerful agri-business magnates to ignore regulations and 
corrupt judicial processes (International Crisis Group 2001; Matthew and van Gelder 2002). 
These forces naturally wish to preserve a local-national scale for environmental governance 
since at this level their interests prevail. By increasing surveillance and bringing in new 
actors, securitizing and regionalizing forestry governance directly threatens their primitive 
accumulation strategies and their ability to subvert domestic governance.  
Local politico-business elites constrain rescaling or the efficacy of rescaled 
institutions in several ways. One is simply to withhold cooperation or to deflect it in a non-
threatening direction. For example, when Singaporean officials and their partners deployed in 
Jambi, the bupati denied them access to locally licensed plantations, diverting them instead to 
nationally licensed ones, thereby protecting his corporate allies. Another approach is to 
systematically under-fund the local state apparatuses that are part of the regionalised fire 
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control system. For example, in the most fire-prone area of Jambi province there are just 15 
trained fire-fighters, with an annual budget of $22,000, to cover a total area of 646,000 
hectares. In practice the districts rely almost entirely on the fire-fighting units of the MoF or 
nationally-licensed firms, though a Singaporean-sponsored review revealed the latter did not 
meet legal requirements while the former actually spend most of their time fighting fires on 
palm oil plantations (Sanders 2012).  
This also illustrates the way in which local state-business nexuses mould the operation 
of rescaled state apparatuses to suit themselves. This includes regional institutions. For 
instance, when the ASEAN Panel of Experts deployed to Kalimantan in 2008, they 
discovered that 1,000 hectares of land were being burned to establish a rice plantation. The 
local government possessed the capacities to extinguish the fires, but was deliberately 
withholding them to assist the company involved. The provincial governor also tried to 
prevent fire governance being scaled upwards, urging the Panel not to recommend the 
deployment of national or international fire-fighting forces. It instead insisted on local 
capacities being used, but the fire was apparently not tackled until the burning had been 
completed (Zurkarnain 2012). On other occasions, the Panel’s reports have been doctored 
under pressure from government officials keen to protect their institutional failures from 
external scrutiny. As one academic expert on the Panel observes, “the real experts, we will 
say everything true, based on scientific knowledge. But sometimes this information is not so 
good for politicians or officials” who instead demand “a compromise statement” (Saharjo 
2011). 
Finally, efforts to tackle fire and haze are deflected towards smallholders and local 
communities, who lack powerful political backers. Local environmental agencies concentrate 
on “educating” villagers about the dangers of using fire, which is as patronising as it is 
ineffective, since poor farmers cannot, unlike companies, afford zero-burning land-clearing 
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technologies. Less benign is the tendency of police forces to select these easy targets: while 
poor villagers are frequently prosecuted, only two plantation managers have ever been put on 
trial. As one local forestry official comments, “it’s easy for companies to avoid prosecution; 
but if we treated companies strictly... it would endanger the business climate in Indonesia. 
That’s why the government doesn’t enforce the law strongly” (Tanpidau 2011). 
Importantly, however, resistance to rescaling is not confined to the local level. 
National agencies like the MoF embrace rescaling to the extent it strengthens their hand 
against local authorities, but resist fully internationalizing the issue, citing Singaporean and 
Malaysian non-cooperation in areas like the smuggling of illegal timber, the felling of which 
is said to increase forests’ vulnerability to fire. This has emboldened national legislators – 
some of whom are linked to agri-business interests or whose parties rely on “donations” 
funneled upwards from the districts – to refuse to ratify the ASEAN Haze Agreement. 
Legislators have rejected ASEAN agreements as containing no “balance of benefits,” 
asserting that “we do not need to be afraid of pressures from other countries” (Straits Times 
2006). Although significant rescaling has occurred regardless, this resistance has ultimately 
circumscribed it, preventing haze receiving maximal attention and resources and enabling 
government agencies and others to respond to international pressure by saying “we are not 
obliged” to cooperate (ASEAN Official 2011). This illustrates how national states may retain 
an important role as “scale managers,” despite the relativization of scale (Mahon and Keil 
2009). This resistance is frequently couched in a nationalist-developmentalist ideological 
discourse, attracting support from a wider constituency. The palm oil industry is a huge 
export earner, garnering $16.4bn in 2010, 2.3 percent of Indonesia’s GDP. Citing significant 
smallholder participation, the government aims to double output from 2011-2020 as part of 
its poverty alleviation strategy. External criticism of the sector’s environmental record is 
often depicted as a virtual conspiracy to retard Indonesia’s development.  
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Finally, notwithstanding the opportunism of some nationalist responses, constraints 
on the rescaling of governance clearly emanate from the regional and global political 
economy. Although the haze is frequently blamed solely on Indonesia, natural resource 
exploitation and associated environmental degradation and pollution is clearly driven by 
international consumer demand for forestry and agricultural products, and by the practices of 
foreign companies, including those headquartered in Singapore and Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
timber-processing industry apparently relies on smuggled timber, including from Indonesia, 
for nearly three-quarters of its input, while Singaporean-based firms like Asia-Pacific 
Resources International Ltd (APRIL) and Asia Pulp and Paper also operate vast mills in 
Indonesia which NGOs accuse of using illegally-felled timber (Nguitragool 2011:92; 
Jikalahari 2008). The expansion of palm oil in Indonesia has also been powerfully driven by 
Malaysian firms due to the exhaustion of land supplies in Malaysia, and they are regularly 
accused of using fire (FoE 2008).   
The influence of such interests in Malaysia and Singapore, where corporate power is 
also intertwined with state structures, has doubtless constrained how far these governments 
will push for the rescaling of environmental security governance or forcefully intervene to 
suppress illegal activities. They reject, for instance, suggestions to regulate their transnational 
corporations’ overseas activities. Major agribusinesses, including APRIL and Sinar Mas, 
were actually directly involved in Singapore’s governance projects in Indonesia (NEA 2009: 
11, 23, 16-17). Their presence arguably helped limit the project’s objectives to establishing 
surveillance mechanisms and educating small-scale farmers in zero-burn techniques, rather 
than creating enforcement mechanisms capable of taking on the powerful corporate interests 
that generate most of the fires. This reminds us that a full explanation of transboundary 
security issues is rarely complete without taking into account the complex and evolving 
organization of economic, social and political power within and beyond the state. 
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Conclusion 
Non-traditional security problems have become increasingly important to policymakers, 
practitioners and scholars in recent times. Existing critical approaches in security studies, 
which aim to explain the politics of securitization, are incapable of understanding the drivers 
of this apparent trend and its various dimensions because of their neglect of the relationship 
between securitization and broader processes of social, economic and political change, and 
state transformation in particular. While agreeing that security is inherently socially 
constructed, political and contested, we argue that explanations cannot be found solely in 
security’s discourses. Drawing on insights from political geography and state theory, we 
claim that the observed shift within security needs to be conceptualized in terms of a deep-
seated historical transformation in the scale of the state’s institutions and activities. Struggles 
over the meaning of security and its governance between competing coalitions are part of 
broader conflicts over the organization of political rule across both institutional and 
geographical spaces. The haze case study revealed that the inherently conflict-ridden 
processes of securitization-rescaling and resistance to it generate highly uneven outcomes. 
This focus on structural constraints and the ideologies and interests of historically specific 
coalitions of agents provides a way of explaining variation in the governance of security 
issues across space and time. 
 Our goal has been to help understand the historically-specific rise of NTS issues and 
to explain the governance systems emerging to manage them by situating the phenomenon of 
“securitization” within a broader social and political context. Clearly, however, much more 
research is required to refine this framework and its deployment. More work is also needed to 
delineate the normative implications of security’s rescaling. Generally speaking, the shifting 
of governance into spaces beyond the national level involves removing them from democratic 
control, since these spaces may be dominated by technocrats or technical experts and are 
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generally beyond the reach of representative institutions. As we have shown, there is no scale 
at which it is “natural” or “best” to govern a given issue; rather, particular scales privilege the 
interests, ideologies and agendas of particular forces, and any given arrangement must be 
normatively evaluated in that light.  
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